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2Abstract
This paper seeks to further establish the effects of fiscal decentralization on income
inequality. While many major world organizations, such as the United Nations, and
politicians are promoting the use of decentralization policies, their effects on income
inequality remain largely unstudied. I add to the literature on fiscal decentralization in
order to determine if it should be used as a policy tool designed to decrease income
inequality. I empirically study the effects of fiscal decentralization by using a model
largely based off of Akai and Sakata (2005). I quantify fiscal decentralization with two
measures in order to conclude what form of fiscal decentralization, if any, should be used
in order to decrease income inequality. My hope is that this paper contributes to the
literature on fiscal decentralization, specifically in providing caution to politicians who
haphazardly institute policies calling for increased fiscal decentralization.
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41. Introduction
In the last two decades, the debate concerning decentralization in government has
been one of increasing importance. Many major organizations have praised
decentralization as a method of political and economic reform for both wealthy and poor
countries. The World Bank in 2000 touted decentralization as a means to increase both
economic growth and equality, citing the examples of India and China’s major efforts to
decentralize. However, some economists and politicians are more skeptical of the effects
of decentralization due to a lack of empirical evidence that proves its success as a reform
policy.
Much of the confusion regarding decentralization can be traced to its multiple
definitions and forms. Most simply, decentralization is the reassignment of power,
authority, and responsibility from higher levels of government to lower levels.
Decentralization has three major forms: political, administrative, and fiscal. While the
political and administrative forms of decentralization have been examined in other
papers, I will address the effects of only fiscal decentralization. Specifically, fiscal
decentralization is the transfer of revenue-raising and expenditure decisions to lower
levels of government, both in terms of the authority that these lower levels have in
spending and raising money, and their fiscal independence from the central government.
While the debate surrounding decentralization involves many issues, a key
concern is its effects on income inequality. Some economists believe that fiscal
decentralization raises income inequality because it causes less centralized redistribution
policies. Other economists believe fiscal decentralization better appropriates
accountability, heightens efficiency, and prevents soft-budget constraints, ultimately
5decreasing income inequality. The multidimensional nature of fiscal decentralization has
led to ambiguous conclusions regarding its effect on income inequality. For these
reasons, fiscal decentralization needs to be empirically examined in order to assess its net
effect on income inequality.
Many qualitative papers have been published regarding fiscal decentralization,
especially in regards to its effects on economic growth. However, there seems to be a
paucity of literature that considers the effects of fiscal decentralization on income
inequality. While fiscal decentralization can be implemented for various reasons, its
impact on income inequality needs to be studied in order to provide support for or
opposition to its use as a policy to alleviate income inequality. Results concerning the
effects of fiscal decentralization on income inequality can provide more information that
can be directed at policy-makers, specifically those who support the more laissez-faire
style of government that decentralization promotes.
My hope is that this paper provides empirical results that can be used in the fiscal
decentralization debate. As many leaders are urging the use of decentralization, its
effects on income inequality must be determined. In order to ascertain these effects, I
study the effects of federal-to-state fiscal decentralization on income inequality in the
United States over the years 1977 to 2005. I use two measures of fiscal decentralization
to determine its general effects on income inequality. By using two fiscal
decentralization measures, the various decentralization policies can be compared to one
another in terms of effectiveness. Additionally, for various years in this time frame I use
a number of additional explanatory variables to control for differences amongst states.
Most importantly, I hope this paper will add to the literature on the effects of fiscal
6decentralization in order to ascertain if it should be used as a policy designed to reduce
income inequality.
I will begin this paper by reviewing the literature of fiscal decentralization in
order to provide a background to this paper. I will then discuss the methodology and data
before describing the results of my empirical work. Finally, I will discuss the
conclusions of this thesis and other research that can be done to further determine the
effects of fiscal decentralization on income inequality.
2. Literature Review
Although fiscal decentralization has grown increasingly popular among
politicians, there is not extensive literature in the field. Nevertheless, this paper largely
builds from the Akai and Sakata (2005) econometric model, which examined the effects
of fiscal decentralization on income inequality in the United States from 1993-2000.
Akai and Sakata performed an econometric study using cross sectional data for United
States counties in order to determine if fiscal decentralization affects income inequality.
Akai and Sakata quantified fiscal decentralization with two measures, authority
power and autonomy power. Akai and Sakata defined authority power as an average of a
revenue indicator and a production indicator, each of which capture different aspects of
the control a state has over its finances. Mathematically, the revenue indicator is the share
of state revenue to the sum of state revenue and revenue received from the federal
government. This ratio attempts to measure the authority a state government has in
raising its own revenue. Conversely, the production indicator is the share of state
expenditure to the sum of state expenditure and state money given to the federal
7government. Like the revenue indicator, the production indicator measures the degree of
authority the state has, although in this case over its spending rather than its revenue.
Authority power and income inequality are hypothesized to be positively correlated
because the higher the authority power of the state, the less power the central government
possesses. This may affect the success, or even existence, of centralized redistribution
policies designed to lower income inequality.
In contrast, some economists assert that the presence of a strong central
government actually prevents states from establishing hard-budgets. This may alter the
incentives of states to remain on budget because of moral hazard problems, as states
essentially have a federally provided safety net. To capture this, Akai and Sakata define
an autonomy indicator of fiscal decentralization that measures the independence of the
state from the federal government. This indicator is computed as the share of state
revenue to the sum of state revenue and revenue received from the federal government.
This quantification of autonomy power is identical to the revenue share indicator;
however, it is not averaged with another indicator so that the autonomy of a state alone
can be captured. This will be further discussed in the methodology. Autonomy power
and income inequality are hypothesized to be negatively correlated. This is because as
the autonomy power of the state is greater, public policy may be conducted more
efficiently due to the imposition of hard-budget constraints. Most likely, enhanced public
policy reduces income inequality, as the state government more prudently uses its own
revenue.
The results of Akai and Sakata’s econometric model affirmed the hypothesis that
greater autonomy power reduces income inequality. They find, however, no significant
8effect of greater authority power on income inequality. This led Akai and Sakata to
conclude that fiscal decentralization, if used as a commitment device, can reduce income
inequality.
While I use Akai and Sakata’s model as a foundation for my econometric model,
I expand the years of the study to 1977-2005 in order to perform a more extensive panel
regression. Due to the panel format, I am able to control for fixed and time effects, while
Akai and Sakata did not. Furthermore, I study federal-to-state fiscal decentralization,
instead of the state-to-county fiscal decentralization analyzed in Akai and Sakata (2005).
Shankar and Shah (2001) likewise test the effects of decentralization on income
inequality. Their paper compared the effectiveness of public policy aimed at reducing
income inequality between centralized and decentralized states. Shankar and Shah
referred to states with high degrees of centralization as unitary and those with less
centralization as federal. Shankar and Shah concluded that federal, or decentralized,
countries are more effective in decreasing and restraining regional inequalities than
unitary countries. They attributed this to the political risk of high levels of income
inequality within decentralized countries. While Shankar and Shah performed a
comparative study, I intend to study the effects of fiscal decentralization on income
inequality only in the United States. This affords the opportunity to develop a more
complex model than that of Shankar and Shah, which consisted of regressing income
inequality only on the category of the country, either federal or unitary. This simplified
regression did not attempt to quantify fiscal decentralization or account for the different
means in which fiscal decentralization can be promoted.
9Shah (2006) published another paper in which he studied the effects of fiscal
decentralization on macroeconomic performance. Shah concluded that fiscal
decentralization leads to improved macroeconomic performance, attributing this to
heightened accountability and constituent decision-making. Shah also empirically
concluded that fiscal decentralization improves both public sector management and use
of tax monies. This in turn may affect income inequality because when money is spent
more efficiently on public investment and welfare programs, income inequality may
decrease. While Shah focuses on macroeconomic management, I concentrate specifically
on income inequality. Nevertheless, Shah (2006) provides insight into why fiscal
decentralization may decrease income inequality from a macroeconomic performance
perspective.
Interestingly, although there is a paucity of literature concerning income
inequality and fiscal decentralization, much literature has been published on the
evolutionary nature of fiscal decentralization. Sato and Yamashige (2000) performed an
empirical study concluding that fiscal decentralization is more desired in poor areas
because the government is viewed to neglect citizens’ needs. However, Sato and
Yamashige assert that once citizens’ welfare has improved, centralization will then be
demanded. Sato and Yamashige assert that fiscal decentralization follows an inevitable
evolutionary path, regardless of the government’s use of it as an intentional policy. In
my paper, however, I do not intend to study such an evolutionary approach, as I focus on
the specifics of income inequality and fiscal decentralization. Nevertheless, the idea that
fiscal decentralization is evolutionary is interesting to the topic at hand.
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Although the above literature supports the use of fiscal decentralization to
decrease income inequality, other literature has expressed doubt concerning its ability to
do so. Beramendi (2003) concluded that decentralization itself does not affect income
inequality; instead, he believes the internal structures of a country dictate the overall
effects of decentralization on income inequality. Though Beramendi studies political
decentralization in his paper, his conclusions still are applicable to fiscal decentralization.
The impact of fiscal decentralization on income inequality would certainly differ in a
socialist country in comparison to a capitalist country. Beramendi’s conclusions played a
large role in my decision to use states within the same country to compare the effects of
fiscal decentralization because of similar ideological structures within the states. I also
use a vector of explanatory variables in order to control for differences amongst the
states.
Von Braun and Grote (2000) likewise voice concerns regarding the ability of
fiscal decentralization to reduce poverty in poor areas. Von Braun and Grote assert that
the implementation of a fiscal decentralization policy will not in itself lead to reductions
in poverty. Instead, they believe that decentralization should be used as one of many tools
to ensure efficient governance in the face of globalization. Von Braun and Grote,
however, do not believe that fiscal decentralization has a decisive impact on income
inequality per se. Von Braun and Grote caution against one possible effect of fiscal
decentralization, that of the wealthy capturing government offices. If this occurs, efforts
to reduce poverty and income inequality can be hampered because the wealthy may have
different political agendas than the poor.
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Bardhan (2002) also is skeptical regarding the effects of decentralization on
income inequality, particularly in poor areas. Bardhan asserts that centralized
redistribution policies are necessary to alleviate poverty and reduce income inequality in
poor areas. Though Bardhan agrees that decentralization theoretically introduces checks
and balances, efficiency, and political autonomy, he cautions that these advantages may
not be realized in poor areas. He attributes this to the fact that centralized governments
may better provide public infrastructure and rule enforcement than lower levels of
government. Bardhan concludes that decentralization can harm those who it is in
actuality designed to help. In this paper, I plan to empirically determine the effects of
fiscal decentralization on income inequality in order to provide more insight into
qualitative conclusions such as those of Bardhan.
In this study, I plan to empirically test many of the critiques leveled against fiscal
decentralization. While many economists and politicians support or oppose fiscal
decentralization, it needs to be more closely examined to ascertain its true effects on
income inequality. I plan to do this by using a model that is based on the Akai and
Sakata (2005) paper in order to empirically determine the effects of fiscal
decentralization on income inequality.
3. Methodological Section
In order to determine the effects of fiscal decentralization on income inequality, I
use a model largely based on that of Akai and Sakata (2005). In this model, I regress
income inequality for each state, as measured by the gini coefficient, on measures of
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fiscal decentralization and a vector of control variables used to account for differences
among states. The control variables will be discussed shortly.
The general equation for the model is given as:
INit = 0 + 1FDit + Bit + it,
where i denotes state, t denotes time, IN is the gini coefficient, FD represents the degree
of fiscal decentralization of the state from the federal government, B represents a vector
of explanatory control variables, and  is a regression error term. The degree of fiscal
decentralization is the most important variable in this equation because the purpose of
this thesis is to study its effects on income inequality. For this reason, I will discuss the
measures of fiscal decentralization used in detail.
Fiscal decentralization is difficult to quantify due to the nuanced nature of its
definition; however, it has been computed in models by calculating an authority indicator,
which is the average of a state’s revenue and production shares. Revenue share is the
ratio of state revenue to combined state revenue and state revenue received from the
federal government. This measure is intended to quantify the degree of authority that the
state government has in raising its own revenue. For example, if revenue share falls,
monetary power is more centralized in the federal government because states have less
authority over raising their own revenue. Production share is the ratio of state
expenditure to combined state expenditure and state money given to the federal
government. This captures the authority a state government has over spending its own
money. For instance, if the production indicator were low, it would indicate that the state
government does not have much discretion over its spending because a high proportion of
its money is being directed to the federal government. The authority indicator is a proxy
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for fiscal decentralization because it measures the amount of power each state has over
revenue and spending decisions. An increase in the authority indicator is hypothesized to
increase income inequality by reducing the federal government’s ability to conduct
centralized redistribution policies.
While the above measure of fiscal decentralization captures the authority each
state has over its fiscal affairs, I also use an autonomy indicator to quantify fiscal
decentralization. The autonomy indicator is the ratio of state revenue to combined state
revenue and federal grant money given to a state. Mathematically, it is the same as the
revenue share measure that is a component of the authority indicator. However, the
autonomy indicator focuses solely on revenue and thus the autonomy of a state from the
federal government. This measure of fiscal decentralization quantifies the degree to
which states finance their own fiscal needs, thus gauging independence from the federal
government. Autonomy power is hypothesized to be negatively correlated with income
inequality, as when the ratio increases, states are more independent. Consequently, states
may more efficiently spend revenue due to the necessity of hard-budget constraints. This
increased efficiency in spending may cause less money to be squandered on unessential
projects or programs.
Measuring fiscal decentralization is imperfect, yet these two quantifications
attempt to do so. The autonomy indicator may have reverse causation problems with
income inequality, as states with high levels of income inequality may get more transfers
from the central government. However, as will be explained shortly, I explore lagged
effects of fiscal decentralization in attempt to control for this reverse causation.
Additionally, some of the transfers given by the federal government, such as Medicaid,
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do not overtly show up in income measures; nonetheless, the purposes of these programs
remain redistributional and may therefore still affect income inequality. While imperfect,
the use of both the autonomy and authority indicators helps elucidate the
multidimensional effects of fiscal decentralization.
The control variables used in the model are listed below, with a brief description
in order to better understand their purpose:
 Real gross state product per capita: used to control for economic differences
between states
 Population mobility factor: used to control for infrastructure differences
(measured by highway mileage per square mile)
 Population density: measured by person per square mile
 Education: percentage of high school graduates under age 25
 Manufacture: share of manufacturing and construction GSP to nominal GSP
 Political factors: percentage of Democrats in state legislature
 Unemployment rate: measure of economic strength and a control for business
cycles
 Population: control for size of state
I initially run regressions without time or fixed effects. I then compare these results to
regressions that control for time effects, fixed effects, and a combination of both in order
to account for unobserved factors that may influence income inequality. By using time
and fixed effects, I better specify the model by recognizing that the control variables most
likely do not capture economic conditions affecting each state or the particular events of a
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certain year. Consequently, I hope the results more accurately reflect the true impact of
fiscal decentralization on income inequality.
4. Data
In order to better understand the methodology and results of this paper, the data
collection must be explained. Data for the gini coefficient and each fiscal
decentralization measure were collected annually for the years 1977-2005, while data for
the control variables were gathered only for the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005.
The control variables were collected only for these years because much of the data are
available only on a decennial basis, or simply are not available for earlier years. The
majority of the data are from the United States Census Bureau; however, I also obtained
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the
Federal Highway Administration.
The various regressions take into account the limited years for which control
variables are available. Regressions for the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 are
estimated without the control variables in order to provide a benchmark for the
regressions that do include control variables. These results are compared side by side in
Tables 1-3 and Tables 5-7. I also analyze, however, the effects of fiscal decentralization
on income inequality in regressions using annual data for the years 1977-2005. In these
regressions, income inequality is regressed only on fiscal decentralization, without
control variables, in order to have a larger set of observations. These regression results
are presented in Tables 4 and 8.
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5. Results
In order to better explain the results, I have divided this section according to the
fiscal decentralization measure. It is important to note that both authority power and
autonomy power are measures of fiscal decentralization; however, as previously
discussed, each represents different methods in which fiscal decentralization can be
promoted.
5A. Revenue-Production Indicator
The revenue-production indicator measures the authority that a state has in terms
of raising and spending its own revenue. Mathematically, it is an average of the revenue
indicator and the production indicator. The revenue indicator measures the authority of a
state over raising its own revenue. The production indicator, however, measures the
amount of authority a state has in spending its own money, taking state money given to
the federal government into account. In order to better approximate the authority power
of a state, these two indicators are averaged and referred to as the revenue-production
indicator. Again, however, the term authority power, as opposed to the revenue-
production indicator, will most often be referenced throughout this section. It is also
important to note that ‘general’ regressions refer to those that do not include control
variables.
Revenue-Production Indicator Regressions
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When regressing income inequality on only the authority indicator for the years
1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, the authority indicator loses significance once fixed
and time effects are accounted for. These results are presented in Table 1. When neither
time nor fixed effects were controlled for, authority power was significant and negatively
correlated with income inequality. This significance remains if only time effects are
controlled for. When fixed effects are specified, however, authority power is no longer
significantly correlated with income inequality, and this lack of significance remains if
both time and fixed effects are specified, regardless of the inclusion of control variables.
When the data is expanded to include the years 1977-2005, the results of the
general regression of income inequality on only the authority indicator change. As seen
in Table 4, when time and fixed effects are controlled for, authority power and income
inequality are positively related. This signifies that increased fiscal decentralization, as
captured by authority power, may actually increase income inequality. This conclusion
differs from that of Akai and Sakata (2005), which found authority power to be
insignificant.1
Current and Lagged Revenue-Production Indicator
In order to explore the possibility of authority power operating with a lag,
regressions were estimated using both the authority indicator for a given year and its
three past lags. These results are shown in Table 2. When controlling for time and fixed
1 As explained earlier, the revenue indicator, which in part comprises the revenue-production indicator, is
identical to the autonomy indicator. Consequently, the positive correlation between the authority indicator and
income inequality is in part driven by the production indicator. In basic regressions, the production indicator is
positively correlated with income inequality. This explains the difference between the results of the authority
and autonomy indicator, which will be discussed later. The authority indicator, however, needs to be an average
of these two indicators in order to have comparable results to Akai and Sakata (2005) and also to truly capture
the authority of a state over both spending and raising revenue.
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effects for the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, but excluding the control
variables, the first and second lags of the revenue-production indicator were significant
with net positive correlation. When control variables were added to the regression, both
the first and second lag of the revenue-production indicator remained significant. The
first lag of the revenue-production indicator was positively correlated with income
inequality, yet the second lag was negatively correlated. However, the net effect of the
significant authority power indicators on income inequality was still one of positive
correlation.
These results are consistent with regressions in which the data are expanded to
cover the years 1977-2005, excluding the control variables, as shown in Table 4. In the
regressions, control variables are excluded and income inequality is only regressed on the
gini coefficient for a larger set of data. Authority power, when specifying fixed and time
effects, is again on net is positively correlated with income inequality. These results
imply that the higher the authority power of a state from the federal government, the
higher the income inequality of the state. This result differs from the Akai and Sakata
(2005) conclusion in which authority power was found to have no significant effect on
income inequality.
Only Lagged Revenue-Production Indicator
As can be seen in Table 2, in regressions controlling for fixed and time effects,
authority power often has no significant contemporaneous impact on income inequality,
while its lags do. Consequently, a regression was run using only the lags of the authority
indicator in order to have a more appropriate specification. The results of this regression,
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as presented in Table 3, are consistent with the prior results involving the revenue-
production indicator. When time and fixed effects were controlled for, the general
regression of income inequality on the revenue-production indicator for the years 1980,
1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 revealed a net positive correlation. This net positive
correlation remains even when control variables are added. Again, though, the first lag
of the revenue-production indicator was positive, while the second lag was negative.
Even when the data was expanded for this general regression, positive correlation
remained, as seen in Table 4. According to these regressions, it seems that the authority
power of a state and its income inequality are positively related, even when controlling
for time and fixed effects.
5B. Autonomy Indicator
The autonomy indicator is a proxy for the independence of a state from the central
government, referred to as its autonomy power. The autonomy indicator is calculated by
dividing state revenue by combined state revenue and federal grant revenue to that state.
As the autonomy indicator rises, a state finances more of its revenue by itself,
heightening autonomy power. Throughout this section, I will interpret the results by
referring to the effect of a change in autonomy power on income inequality.
Autonomy Power Regressions
When regressing the gini coefficient on only the autonomy indicator for the years
1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, the autonomy power of the state is significant and
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negatively correlated with income inequality. As seen in Table 5, this result holds when
control variables are added to the regression. Similar to Akai and Sakata (2005), this
simple regression leads to the conclusion that if fiscal decentralization is promoted in a
manner emphasizing greater autonomy, the lower will be income inequality.
Consistent with the previous results, autonomy power is found to be negatively
correlated with income inequality in the general regression controlling for only time
effects. However, when control variables are added to this regression, the autonomy
indicator is no longer significant. Even more telling, when a regression is run controlling
for both time and fixed effects simultaneously, neither the general regression of the gini
coefficient on the autonomy indicator, nor the regression with control variables added,
shows a significant effect of autonomy power. This indicates that autonomy power has
no significant effect on income inequality. This result differs from the Akai and Sakata
(2005) conclusions, which asserted that autonomy power is negatively correlated with
income inequality.
While the above results use only data for the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and
2005, when the data set is expanded to 1977-2005, the results are similar, as displayed in
Table 8. When controlling for time or fixed effects, autonomy power is negatively
correlated with income inequality. However, when both time and fixed effects are
specified, autonomy power is no longer significantly correlated with income inequality.
Current and Lagged Autonomy Indicator
Although the above results cast doubt upon the effects of autonomy power on
income inequality, the possibility of fiscal decentralization operating with a lagged effect
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again needs to be examined. Though the autonomy power of a state did not have
significant effects on income inequality when controlling for fixed and time effects, a
regression using autonomy power and its three past lags changes the results, as seen in
Table 6. When controlling for both time and fixed effects, each of the lags of the
autonomy indicator was individually significant in a regression excluding control
variables using data from 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. The net effect of the
significant lagged autonomy indicators shows positive correlation with income
inequality. When control variables were added to the regression, each of the three lagged
autonomy indicators was again significant. The net effect of the significant autonomy
indicators on income inequality again displays positive correlation between autonomy
power and income inequality. Consequently, a fiscal decentralization policy emphasizing
increased state autonomy may actually increase income inequality after accounting for
lagged effects.
When the data is expanded to the years 1977-2005, the results are similar, as seen
in Table 8. When controlling for time and fixed effects, the net effect of the autonomy
power of a state on income inequality is positive. Again, this means that fiscal
decentralization, in terms of autonomy power, may actually increase income inequality.
Only Lagged Autonomy Indicator
As displayed in Table 6, the autonomy indicator usually has no significant
relation to the income inequality of that same year. Due to these results, another
regression was run using only the three past lags of the autonomy indicator. The results
again changed in the regression controlling for fixed and time effects, which can be seen
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in Table 7. While the general regression with no control variables still shows a net
positive relationship between autonomy power and income inequality, when control
variables were added, the relationship became, on net, negative. Each of the three lagged
variables was significant in the regression involving control variables, and the net effect
of autonomy power on income inequality was negative. Consequently, when the
regression was more appropriately specified, autonomy power is negatively correlated
with income inequality. This result is consistent with the conclusion of Akai and Sakata
(2005) that an increase in autonomy power leads to lower levels of income inequality.
5C. Control Variables
While the focus of this paper is to ascertain the effects of fiscal decentralization
on income inequality, it is nonetheless important to comment on the relationship of the
various control variables on income inequality. When observing the tables, many control
variables lack significance. Although these control variables should be included to
account for differences among the states for theoretical reasons, their lack of significance
concerned me. Consequently, the joint significance of the entire subset of control
variables was tested in a variety of regressions. Each of these post-estimation tests found
these variables to be highly jointly significant, and thus, empirically belonging in the
regression analysis.
In the above tests, the entire subset of control variables was used to test joint
significance. However, when reviewing the results, two control variables in particular
were found to be significant more often than the other variables: percentage of
construction and manufacturing in gross state product and the unemployment rate.
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Accordingly, the joint significance of the control variables excluding these two variables
was tested. Overall, the remaining subset of control variables is highly jointly significant.
Due to the high degree of joint significance for the control variables, it is both
theoretically and empirically sound to include the control variables in each regression.
The unemployment variable, which was usually significant, is often positively
correlated with income inequality. This correlation was expected, as it seems logical that
the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the income inequality. If many people are
unemployed in a state, this would contribute to a higher income inequality, as a larger
fraction of the workforce is not earning an income. Likewise, the negative correlation
between income inequality and the percentage of a state’s gross state product devoted to
construction and manufacturing is consistent with the interpretation that construction and
manufacturing provide relatively high-paying blue collar jobs.
6. Conclusion
This paper examined the effects of two forms of fiscal decentralization, authority
power and autonomy power, on income inequality. The results of this paper show that
authority power is positively correlated with income inequality, while autonomy power is
negatively correlated with income inequality. The implications of these findings have a
basis in the theoretical explanation that the greater authority power over fiscal decisions
lessens the redistributive role of the federal government, whereas greater autonomy of a
state over its revenue leads to a more efficient and equitable provision of state spending.
The results concerning authority power have linkages to the literature on fiscal
decentralization. Although this paper found authority power to be positively correlated
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with income inequality, Akai and Sakata (2005) stated that authority power has no
significant effect on income inequality. These results may differ due to my extension of
their work by using different data and regression techniques. Akai and Sakata tested the
effects of state-to-county fiscal decentralization on income inequality, while this paper
focuses on federal-to-state fiscal decentralization. This may play a role to the extent that
the problems of a specific state and its counties are more similar in relation to one another
than the United States and a specific state. Consequently, state-to-county authority power
may not have as large as an effect on income inequality as federal-to-state authority
power. Additionally, Akai and Sakata did not consider lagged or fixed effects; instead,
they used only time effects and regional dummies in their regressions in concluding that
authority power had no significant effect on income inequality.
The positive relationship between authority power and income inequality finds
other support in the literature. Bardhan (2002) expressed concern regarding the impact of
fiscal decentralization on federal redistribution policies. As previously mentioned, the
greater the authority power of a state, the less money given to the federal government as
measured by the production indicator. This decreases the financing and ability of the
federal government to reduce income inequality through centralized redistribution
policies.
In contrast, the autonomy power of a state was found to lower income inequality
with a lagged effect. These results are displayed in Table 7. When more closely
examining the column of Table 7 that specifies fixed and time effects, the first lag of the
autonomy power shows positive correlation, while the second and third lag displays
negative correlation. This result indicates that initially, fiscal decentralization, as captured
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by autonomy power, may actually increase income inequality. If a state is committed to
using such a fiscal decentralization device, income inequality will, on net, decrease in
subsequent years. However, if a state is not dedicated to a fiscal decentralization form
that promotes autonomy power, income inequality can actually increase. In order for a
state to realize the benefits of this form of fiscal decentralization, it must make a
continued, conscious effort to increase and maintain its autonomy power. Overall, the
results regarding autonomy power’s effect on income inequality are similar to the Akai
and Sakata (2005) paper. Although their results are consistent with the findings in this
paper, I extend their work by using dynamic regression specifications, a larger set of data,
and focusing on federal-to-state rather than state-to-county fiscal decentralization.
Heightened autonomy power may also contribute to the formation of hard-budget
constraints within states, which may partly explain the inverse relationship between
autonomy power and income inequality. When states are less likely to receive money
from the federal government, they may budget more effectively. In turn, this may lead to
enhanced public policy, as states may cut superfluous funding to ineffective programs
and policies. For this reason, increased autonomy may decrease the income inequality of
a state. This theory is similar to the view asserted by Shah (2006), in which fiscal
decentralization was found to improve public sector management and the use of tax
revenue.
The results of this paper pose additional questions concerning the effects of fiscal
decentralization on income inequality. Though politicians and other leaders have urged
the use of decentralization, it would be helpful to determine if decentralization has
actually increased. In answering this, more facts about fiscal decentralization could be
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unearthed. While my paper studies the effects of fiscal decentralization on income
inequality, it would be useful to establish if fiscal decentralization is in fact a global
occurrence. If it is not widespread, this may indicate that fiscal decentralization policies
are difficult to enact.
To further understand fiscal decentralization, it would be useful to study the two
fiscal decentralization measures that I use in this paper in more depth. The net impact of
each lagged fiscal decentralization measure on income inequality was carefully analyzed,
but more empirical work should be done to examine the pattern of the lagged effects.
This could offer insight into the operation of these two forms of fiscal decentralization.
More specifically, this examination could provide additional insight to determine if
authority power is positively correlated with income inequality solely due to the
production indicator used in computing the fiscal decentralization measure. Through
examining this, it can be established if the production indicator overshadows the revenue
indicator in the revenue-production regressions. However, in order to capture the true
authority power of a state and also have comparable conclusions to Akai and Sakata’s
work, I felt it necessary to average these two indicators.
Other measures of fiscal decentralization also could be studied. Additional fiscal
decentralization gauges could be formulated which capture other aspects of fiscal
decentralization. Not only would the use of other fiscal decentralization measures help
determine their effect on income inequality, it would also provide more evidence about
which forms of fiscal decentralization should be encouraged. The effect of fiscal
decentralization additionally could be examined in other countries in order to determine if
fiscal decentralization can be used as a global tool to reduce income inequality. With
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such an empirical expansion, papers such as Beramendi (2003), which asserts the impact
of fiscal decentralization is influenced by the internal characteristics of a country, can
better be judged.
The results of this paper provide valuable information regarding fiscal
decentralization. Decentralization is on the rise, and world leaders and organizations are
encouraging its use as a policy tool to reduce income inequality. The results of this
paper, however, warn of the dangers of such a policy, as different forms of fiscal
decentralization have different effects on income inequality. For this reason, fiscal
decentralization should not be promoted as a broad policy; instead, specific forms should
be targeted. The results of this paper imply that increased autonomy power, in contrast to
authority power, is effective in decreasing income inequality if used as a commitment
device. Increased authority power, however, may heighten income inequality. These
results demonstrate the importance of examining fiscal decentralization in more depth,
because if policy-makers simply enact broad fiscal decentralization measures, they may
harm those who they had intended to help.
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Table 1 – Revenue-Production Indicator Results
Basic Regression Time Effects Fixed Effects Time & Fixed Effects
General Control General Control General Control General Control
Revenue-Production
Indicator **-0.2904 **-0.4128 **-0.2287 -0.1282 -0.1809 0.1707 0.1620 0.0774
(.1234) (.0985) (.0991) (.0933) (.1982) (.1419) (.1567) (.1575)
Education **0.0014 **-0.0014 **0.0017 -0.0004
(.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0005)
Population -1.29E-9  2.63E-10 -1.16E-9  -5.57E-9 
(1.47E-9) (1.21E-9) (3.74E-9) (3.64E-9)
RGSP per capita **8.87E-8  3.41E-8  7.85E-8  *1.00E-7 
(4.22E-8) (3.49E-8) (5.50E-8) (5.27E-8)
Unemployment -0.0010 *0.0022 -0.0001 0.0026
(.0013) (.0012) (.0014) (.0016)
Percentage Democrats **0.0632 *0.0195 0.0145 0.0008
(.0116) (.0101) (.0208) (.0199)
Constr. and Manuf. -0.0354 - **-0.0601 **-0.1506 *-0.1017
(.0263) (.0216) (.0550) (.0576)
Population Density 2.57E-6  **1.73E-5  0.0000 ` 0.0001
(9.49E-6) (7.71E-6) (0.0001) (.0001)
Highway per Area **0.0113 -0.0063 -0.0067 -0.0031
(.0045) (.0039) (.0085) (.0083)
R – squared
0.0183
(adjusted)
0.4126
(adjusted)
0.4599
(adjusted)
0.6238
(adjusted)
0.0223
(overall)
0.2401
(overall)
0.4370
(overall)
0.2848
(overall)
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
Notes: The standard error for each coefficient is directly under it, placed in parenthesis. The fiscal decentralization measures for
2005 have not yet been published, so the 2004 data was used in each regression. For a description of each variable, please refer to
the text of this paper. In these regressions, the data was collected from the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 for each state,
with the exception of Nebraska due to its unicameral legislature.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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Table 2 – Revenue-Production Indicator and Lag Results
Time Effects Fixed Effects Time & Fixed Effects
General Control General Control General Control
Revenue-Production *-0.5529 -0.3418 0.4804 -0.0716 -0.2734 -0.3479
(.2871) (.2450) (.3888) (.2589) (.2436) (.2399)
First Lag **0.8393 **0.8352 0.0161 **0.7842 **1.1871 **1.214
(.3736) (.3141) (.4772) (.3281) (.3154) (.3146)
Second Lag -0.1885 -0.3225 0.2583 -0.3945 **-0.5424 **-.5790
(.3003) (.2506) (.3864) (.2611) (.2416) (2.41E-1)
Third Lag -0.3338 -0.3384 **-1.0534 -0.0393 -0.3333 -3.71E-1 
(.2624) (.2218) (.2880) (.2057) (.2357) (2.32E-1)
Education **-0.0013 **1.73E-3  -0.0006
(.0003) (2.67E-4) (0.0005)
Population -4.9E-11 7.71E-10 -4.00E-9 
(1.2E-9) (3.76E-9) (3.48E-9)
RGSP per capita 2.66E-8  4.21E-8  6.37E-8 
(3.45E-8) (5.61E-8) (5.09E-8)
Unemployment **0.0026 -0.0007 *0.0030
(.0012) (.0015) (.0016)
Percentage Democrats **0.0198 0.01710 0.0015
(.0100) (.0206) (.0189)
Constr and Manuf. - **-0.0627 **-0.1325 **-0.1138
(.0214) (.0552) (.0550)
Population Density **2E-5  0.0001 0.0001
(7.65E-6) (.0001) (.0001)
Highway per Area -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0028
(.0039) (.0086) (.0079)
R – squared
0.4670
(adjusted
0.636
(adjusted)
0.0784
(overall)
0.2496
(overall)
0.4615
(overall)
0.3442
(overall)
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245
Notes: The same notes apply as described in Table 1.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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Table 3 – Lagged Only Revenue-Production Indicator Results
Time Effects Fixed Effects Time & Fixed Effects
General Control General Control General Control
First Lag of Rev.-Prod. 0.3235 **0.5211 0.4305 **0.7221 **0.9437 **0.9023
(.2619) (.2194) (.3400) (.2390) (.2292) (.2305)
Second Lag of Rev.-Prod. -0.2104 -0.3400 0.3151 -0.4008 **-0.5604 **-0.5969
(.3018) (.2508) (.3842) (.2595) (.2412) (.2410)
Third Lag of Rev.-Prod. -0.3356 -0.3357 **-1.0710 -0.0388 -0.3062 -0.3360
(0.2639) (.2223) (.2880) (.2051) (.2346) (.2315)
Education **-0.0013 **0.0017 -5.64E-4 
(.0003) (.0003) (5.12E-4)
Population 6.19E-12 7.78E-10 -3.80E-9 
(1.20E-9) (3.75E-9) (3.49E-9)
RGSP per capita 2.55E-8  4.23E-8  6.34E-8 
(3.46E-8) (5.59E-8) (5.10E-8)
Unemployment **0.0024 -0.0006 *0.0029
(.0011) (.0015) (.0016)
Percentage Democrats **0.0207 0.0171 *0.0019
(.0100) (.0206) (.0190)
Constr and Manuf. **-0.0594 **-0.1323 **-0.1121
(.0213) (.0550) (.0552)
Population Density **2E-5  0.0001 0.0001
(7.67E-6) (.0001) (.0001)
Highway per Area -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0026
(.0039) (.0085) (.0080)
R – squared
0.4609
(overall)
0.6345
(adjusted)
0.0812
(overall)
0.2492
(overall)
0.4523
(overall)
0.3571
(overall)
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245
Notes: The same notes apply as described in Table 1.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
33
Table 4: Authority Indicator Results: All Observations
Current Variable Current and Lag Only Lag
Basic TE FE
TE &
FE TE FE
TE &
FE TE FE
TE &
FE
Authority Indicator **-.39 **-.24 **-.44 *.11 *-.21 **-.59 .04
(.05) (.04) (.06) (.06) (.12) (.09) (.08)
First Lag .11 .04 **0.23 -.04 **-.46 **.25
(.14) (.12) (.10) (.12) (.09) (.08)
Second Lag -.04 **-.30 -.01 -0.08 **-.25 -.01
(.14) (.12) (.10) (.14) (.12) (.10)
Third Lag -0.10 **.21 0.03 -.11 **.22 0.03
(.12) (.10) (.09) (.12) (.10) (.09)
R – squared .045 .414 .045 .398 .374 .077 .333 .373 .061 .336
Observations 1400 1400 1400 1400 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300
Notes: This table includes the data from 1977-2005. It provides more data than the ‘general’ regression results shown in prior tables that
only regress the gini coefficient on the fiscal decentralization measure for the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. Again, these
regressions do not use the control variables.
Basic regressions means that neither time effects (TE) nor fixed effects (FE) were specified.
*Significant at the 10-percent level
**Significant at the 5-percent level
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Table 5 – Autonomy Indicator Results
Basic Regression Time Effects Fixed Effects Time & Fixed Effects
General Control General Control General Control General Control
Autonomy Indicator **-0.1434 **-0.2268 **-0.1049 -0.0745 -0.1274 0.0690 0.0542 0.0209
(.0608) (.0484) (.0489) (.0473) (.0985) (.0709) (.0787) (.0790)
Education **0.0014 **-0.0013 **0.0016 -0.0004
(.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0005)
Population -1.12E-9  -2.22E-10 -1.18E-9  -5.66E-9 
(1.46E-9) (1.21E-9) (3.74E-9) (3.64E-9)
RGSP per capita *8.61E-8  3.39E-8  7.95E-8  *1.02E-7 
(4.18E-8) (3.49E-8) (5.51E-8) 5.26E-8 
Unemployment -0.0010 *0.0023 -0.0002 0.0026
(.0013) (.0012) (.0014) (.0016)
Percentage Democrats **0.0634 **0.0202 0.0145 0.0008
(.0115) (.0101) (0.0209) (.0199)
Constr. and Manuf. -0.0380 **-0.0603 **-0.1517 *-0.1022
(.0261) (.0216) (.0550) (.0576)
Population Density 3.72E-6  **1.76E-5  0.0000 0.0001
(9.42E-6) (7.70E-6) (.0001) (.0001)
Highway per Area **0.0110 -0.0062 -0.0065 -0.0031
(.0044) (.0039) (.0085) (.0083)
R – squared
0.0184
(adjusted)
0.4227
(adjusted)
0.4583
(adjusted)
.6248
(adjusted)
0.0224
(overall)
0.2440
(overall)
0.4460
(overall)
0.2834
(overall)
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
Notes- The standard error for each coefficient is directly under it, placed in parenthesis. The fiscal decentralization measures for
2005 have not yet been published, so the 2004 data was used in each regression. For a description of each variable, please refer to
the text of this paper. In these regressions, the data was collected from the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 for each state,
except Nebraska due to its unicameral legislature.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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Table 6 – Autonomy Indicator and Lag Results
Time Effects Fixed Effects Time & Fixed Effects
General Control General Control General Control
Autonomy Indicator *-0.2715 -0.1752 0.2325 -0.455 -0.1533 -0.1867
(.1438) (.1221) (.1940) (.1299) (.1216) (.1120)
First Lag **0.4194 **0.4177 -0.0178 **0.3819 **0.5944 **0.6116
(.1874) (.1568) (.2377) (0.1642) (.1569) (0.1566)
Second Lag -0.0963 -0.1575 0.1258 -0.1881 **-0.2659 **-0.2848
(.1488) (.1238) (.1912) (.1298) (.1194) (.1190)
Third Lag -0.1573 -0.1799 **-0.5243 -0.0288 *-0.1987 *-0.2105
(.1311) (.1105) (.1435) (.1030) (.1173) (.1156)
Education **-0.0013 **1.70E-3  -6.55E-4 
(.0003) (.0003) (5.10E-4)
Population 6.49E-11 7.13E-10 -4.14E-9 
(1.20E-9) (3.77E-9) (3.47E-9)
RGSP per capita 2.47E-8  4.30E-8  6.15E-8 
(3.45E-8) (5.63E-8) (5.07E-8)
Unemployment **0.0027 -7.91E-4  *0.0030
(.0012) (1.47E-3) (.0016)
Pctge. Democrats **0.0208 0.0171 0.0004
(.0101) (.0207) (.0189)
Constr and Manuf. **-0.0614 **-0.1339 **-0.1147
(.0213) (.0553) (.0548)
Population Density **2.5E-5  0.0001 0.0001
(7.65E-6) (.0001) (.0001)
Highway per Area -0.0056 -0.0057 -0.0027
(.0039) (.0086) (.0079)
R – squared
0.4649
(adjusted)
0.6376
(adjusted)
0.0781
(overall)
0.2527
(overall)
0.4683
(overall)
0.3274
(overall)
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245
Notes: The same notes apply as described in Table 5.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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Table 7 – Lagged Only Autonomy Indicator Results
Time Effects Fixed Effects Time & Fixed Effects
General Control General Control General Control
First Lag of Autonomy 0.1646 0.2564 0.1822 **0.3426 **0.4588 **0.4453
(.1308) (.1096) (.1694) (.1195) (.1145) (.1152)
Second Lag of Autonomy -0.1062 -0.1662 0.1534 -0.1922 **-0.2766 **-0.2953
(.1495) (.1239) (.1900) (.1290) (.1193) (.1192)
Third Lag of Autonomy -0.1589 -0.1790 **-0.5325 -0.0285 -0.1841 *-0.1919
(.1318) (.1108) (.1435) (.1027) (.1169) (.1154)
Education **-0.0013 **0.0017 -0.0006
(.0003) (.0003) (.0005)
Population 1.15E-10 7.26E-10 -3.91E-9 
1.20E-9  (3.76E-9) (3.48E-9)
RGSP per capita 2.37E-8  4.32E-8  6.15E-8 
3.45E-8  (5.59E-8) (5.09E-8)
Unemployment **0.0024 -0.0008 *0.0029
(.0011) (.0015) (.0016)
Percentage Democrats **0.0216 0.0171 0.0007
(.0101) (.0206) (.0190)
Constr and Manuf. **-0.0593 **-0.1337 **-0.1134
(.0212) (.0551) (.0550)
Population Density **2.05E-5  0.0001 0.0001
(7.65E-6) (.0001) (.0001)
Highway per Area -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0025
(.0039) (.0086) (.0080)
R – squared
0.4592
(adjusted)
0.6359
(adjusted)
0.0796
(overall)
0.2522
(overall)
0.4595
(overall)
0.3447
(overall)
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245
Notes: The same notes apply as described in Table 5.
* Significant at the 10-percent level
** Significant at the 5-percent level
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Table 8: Autonomy Indicator Results: All Observations
Current Variable Current and Lag Only Lag
Basic TE FE
TE &
FE TE FE
TE &
FE TE FE
TE &
FE
Autonomy Indicator **-.20 **-.12 **-.24 .04 *-.10 **-.30 .02
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.06) (.05) (.04)
First Lag .06 .02 **.11 -.01 **-.24 **.12
(.07) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.04)
Second Lag -.02 **-.15 -.01 -.04 **-.12 -.01
(.07) (.06) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.05)
Third Lag -.05 .08 -.01 -.06 .09 -.01
(.06) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.04)
R – squared .045 .413 .046 .402 .374 .075 .343 .373 .058 .345
Observations 1400 1400 1400 1400 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300
Notes: This table includes the data from 1977-2005. It provides more data than the ‘general’ regression results shown in prior tables that only
regress the gini coefficient on the fiscal decentralization measure for the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. No control variables are used in
this general regression.
Basic regressions mean that neither time effects (TE) nor fixed effects (FE) were specified.
*Significant at the 10-percent level
**Significant at the 5-percent level
